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A group’s collective intelligence reflects its capacity to perform well across a variety of
cognitive tasks and it transcends the individual intelligence of its members. Previous
research shows that group members’ social sensitivity is a potential antecedent of
collective intelligence, yet it is still unclear whether individual or group-level indices
are responsible for the positive association between social sensitivity and collective
intelligence. In a comprehensive manner, we test the extent to which both compositional
(lowest and highest individual score) and compilational aspects (emergent group level) of
social sensitivity are associated with collective intelligence. This study has implications
for research that explores groups as information processors, and for group design as
it indicates how a group should be composed with respect to social sensitivity if the
group is to reach high levels of collective intelligence. Our empirical results indicate
that collectively intelligent groups are those in which the least socially sensitive group
member has a rather high score on social sensitivity. Differently stated, (socially sensitive)
group members cannot compensate for the lack of social sensitivity of the other group
members.
Keywords: collective competencies, group composition, social sensitivity, group synergy, collective intelligence
INTRODUCTION
Small social groups are information-processing units (Hinsz et al., 1997; Hinsz, 2015), extensively
used in organizations to solve problems, make important decisions and generate innovations
(Devine et al., 1999). In order to tackle these complex cognitive problems, groups combine, through
social interactions, the cognitive resources (knowledge, skills, abilities; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006)
of their members in collective, group-level structures and competencies. In other words, groups
are cognitive systems with emergent cognitive competencies that transcend the cognitions of their
individual members (Woolley et al., 2010; Curs¸eu et al., 2013).
An integrative framework that explains the effectiveness of these collective cognitive systems
is the teams as cognitive technology framework (Wallace and Hinsz, 2010; Hinsz, 2015). This
framework argues that teams are a form of human technology and the use of teams can be
seen as a method for solving practical organizational problems, just like the use of any other
technology (Hinsz, 2015). In line with this framework, a group’s cognitive performance results from
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the transformation of the cognitive resources brought in the
group by its individual members. The quality of interpersonal
interactions is critical for the transformation of the cognitive
resources within groups and for the emergence of group
cognition (Curs¸eu et al., 2007). Therefore, team members need
good interpersonal skills in order to be collectively successful in
cognitive tasks.
Recent empirical studies have provided substantial support
for a collective intelligence (CI) factor that describes a group’s
systematic capacity of performing effectively on a variety of
cognitive tasks (Engel et al., 2014, 2015; Woolley et al., 2015
for a review; Woolley et al., 2010). The strongest predictor of
collective intelligence seems to be the average social sensitivity
of the group members (Woolley et al., 2010). Social sensitivity
represents the ability of individuals to accurately attribute mental
states to oneself or another person (Premack andWoodruff, 1978;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In other words, it represents the ability
of groupmembers to put themselves in the mind of other persons
and “tune in” to their mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Social sensitivity is responsible for the way in which we make
sense of and predict behaviors of other people (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001). In groups, harmonious interpersonal interactions are
facilitated by rewarding social exchanges and helping behaviors
(Berkowitz, 1970; Homans, 1974). Social sensitivity is likely to
facilitate these behaviors through group members’ ability to
perceive each other’s mental states, and hence is a prerequisite
for harmonious interpersonal interactions in groups.
Socially sensitive group members attend to the interpersonal
dynamics in groups and create a positive interpersonal
atmosphere that is ultimately conducive to task performance
(Curs¸eu et al., 2015a). Therefore, collective intelligence, as a set
of cognitive competencies that emerge from the task-directed
interpersonal interactions in groups, depends on members’
capacity to accurately perceive their social environment as
demonstrated by the strong relationship between group
members’ social sensitivity and the collective intelligence of
the group (Woolley et al., 2010). Further research is needed to
understand the role of social sensitivity as a source of collective
intelligence in a comprehensive manner; i.e., while it has been
reported that the average social sensitivity of group members
is associated with collective intelligence (Woolley et al., 2010),
the role of other group aggregates (e.g., the minimum social
sensitivity score or the maximum social sensitivity score) has not
been yet explored.
In order to look at this relationship more intricately, we
borrow from the approaches used in the team personality
literature. In a comprehensive review on the effect of personality
on team performance, LePine et al. (2011) argue that one needs
to consider both team composition with respect to various
personality traits of group members as well as the collective,
emergent group personality. Group personality represents the
behavioral regularities exerted by the group as a whole (Stewart,
2003; LePine et al., 2011). Because the estimated positive
effect of average individual social sensitivity on CI could hide
both individual (lowest or highest individual score effects) and
group level effects (emergent group-level social sensitivity),
one needs to distinguish between individual- and group- level
social sensitivity. In addition to the theoretical implications,
this distinction has important implications for group design
as it clarifies how a group should be composed with respect
to social sensitivity if the group is to be highly collective
intelligent.
The main aim of our paper is to explore the association
between different indices of social sensitivity in groups and CI.
In line with team personality models (Barrick et al., 1998; LePine
et al., 2011), we argue that the positive association between
the highest/lowest individual social sensitivity score and CI is
likely to reflect different convergence mechanisms explained by
the compositional and compilational emergence logic described
in the multi-level perspective on groups (Kozlowski and Chao,
2012; Kozlowski et al., 2013).
To summarize, our paper builds on the teams as
cognitive technology framework (Hinsz, 2015) to argue that
transformation processes embedded in interpersonal interactions
are essential for the emergence of collective intelligence. We
use the insights from group personality models (Prewett et al.,
2009; LePine et al., 2011) to argue that social sensitivity is a
key interpersonal attribute that should be considered at the
individual as well as the group level of analysis. In order to
disentangle the mechanisms that drive the association between
social sensitivity and CI, we use the multi-level perspective on
groups (Kozlowski and Chao, 2012; Kozlowski et al., 2013) to
assess the compositional and compilational factors that could
explain the positive association between social sensitivity and
collective intelligence in groups. In order to distinguish between
the compositional and compilational effects of social sensitivity
on collective intelligence, we take into account both individual
social sensitivity (and the way it is distributed within groups as
the minimum and the maximum score) as well as collective social
sensitivity (an attribute that describes the group as a whole).
COMPOSITIONAL ARGUMENTS
Literature to date (Barrick et al., 1998; Devine and Philips, 2001;
LePine, 2003) distinguishes between conjunctive and disjunctive
compositional aggregation models in teams. Conjunctive models
assume that taking into account the lowest individual score has
the highest predictive power for team-level effects. Disjunctive
models, on the other hand, assume that the highest individual
score is the best predictor for team outcomes. Previous research
(Barrick et al., 1998; Devine and Philips, 2001; LePine, 2003)
has associated these operational models with the type of task.
According to Steiner (1972) unitary group tasks (where one
single outcome needs to be generated per group and the task
must be performed by the group as a whole) can be further
classified as conjunctive, disjunctive, additive or discretionary. In
a conjunctive task, the performance of the group is as high as
the lowest performing individual. For example, the performance
of a group of mountaineers who aim to reach the summit will
always depend on the speed of the least capable member. In
a disjunctive task, the performance of the group is as high as
the highest performing individual in the group. For example,
the performance of a group that aims to find a solution for
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a mathematical problem will depend on the problem-solving
capabilities of its best member.
The parallel between the type of task (conjunctive or
disjunctive) and the aggregation method (the minimum score
and respectively the maximum score), however, does not fully
clarify the way in which the lowest or the highest individual
scores relate to group-level outcomes. We further draw on
group diversity and social influence literatures (Moscovici, 1976;
Tanford and Penrod, 1984; Nemeth, 1986; Wood et al., 1994),
to distinguish between minority and majority influence as
mechanisms that explain the positive association between the
highest, and respectively the lowest, individual social sensitivity
scores and CI in groups.
We argue that, if the highest individual social sensitivity score
predicts CI, it means that minority influence processes were
effective and explain the convergence of social sensitivity within
groups. Minority dissent is a source of social influence in the
group and is defined as the situation in which a minority in
the group publicly opposes beliefs, attitudes or ideas held by
the majority (Moscovici, 1976; McLeod et al., 1997). Minorities,
through their opposing views, stimulate the reappraisal of the
situation at hand and widen the attention of the group members
to aspects that have not been previously considered (Nemeth,
1986; Nemeth and Kwan, 1987). As a consequence, minority
dissent has been associated with increased group creativity
(De Dreu and West, 2001; De Dreu, 2002), better problem-
solving (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983) and higher decision-
making performance (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). Similarly, the
most socially sensitive person in the group can confront the
other members with a different and more accurate perspective
on the socio-emotional dynamics of the group. As a result, the
group as a whole is likely to broaden its attention to interpersonal
dynamics and work with the emotional states experienced by the
individual members. This comes in line with the cascadingmodel
of emotional intelligence indicating how emotional perception
and understanding precedes emotional regulation (Joseph and
Newman, 2010). Effective emotion regulation in groups improves
the quality of interpersonal interactions and ultimately group
performance (Curs¸eu et al., 2015a). To conclude, if the maximum
individual score significantly and positively predicts CI, it would
imply that minority influence processes were effective and they
explain the association between social sensitivity and CI.
A significant and positive association between the lowest
individual social sensitivity score and CI means that majority
influence explains the convergence of social sensitivity within
groups. Majority influence is a second source of social influence
in groups and it reflects a situation in which attitudes, ideas
and opinions held by the majority of the group will ultimately
be shared by the group as a whole (Nemeth, 1986). Majorities
have been found to stimulate convergence due to the implicit
assumption held by the group members that the majority must
be correct and due to the fear of disapproval associated with
dissent (Nemeth, 1986). If the majority of the group members
share high social sensitivity (indicated by a rather high score of
the least sensitive group member), this attribute will ultimately
converge, become manifested in interpersonal interactions and
influence the group as a whole. In other words, groups need
a particular threshold for social sensitivity in order to allow
its expression in interpersonal interactions. If the lowest social
sensitivity score significantly and positively predicts CI, it would
imply that majority influence processes, leading to group-level
convergence of social sensitivity, explain the association between
social sensitivity and CI.
Based on this compositional logic and drawing on minority
and majority influences we explore the extent to which the
minimum level of social sensitivity (the group needs to meet
a threshold of social sensitivity) as well as the maximum score
within group (a highly sensitive person is enough) will be
associated to collective intelligence in groups. Differentiating
between the two scores allows us to identify the most likely social
influence process that explains the positive association between
social sensitivity and CI. This exploratory approach comes in line
with similar studies looking at configurations of individual-based
variables within groups such as personality (Barrick et al., 1998)
or cognitive ability (Devine and Philips, 2001).
COMPILATIONAL ARGUMENTS
Beyond the variability of individual social sensitivity within
groups, this attribute can also describe groups as collectives.
Collective induction processes help groups to combine the
individual traits and competencies of their members in collective,
group-level phenomena (Curs¸eu et al., 2015b). We build on the
concept of collective personality (Stewart, 2003; LePine et al.,
2011) to argue that groups may vary in their level of social
sensitivity, and tasks used to evaluate individual social sensitivity
can be extrapolated to evaluate between-group variability in
social sensitivity. Collective personality is an emergent group-
level construct that refers to the behavioral regularities of the
group as a whole (Stewart, 2003; LePine et al., 2011). Collective
personality, as opposed to individual personality, emerges from
interpersonal interactions unfolded in the group (Kozlowski and
Klein, 2000) and can be influenced by individual personalities but
also other factors such as leadership (Hofmann and Jones, 2005)
and interpersonal interactions in groups.
Similar arguments are used in the group synergy literature,
in which collective performance is compared to average, or best,
individual performance in order to evaluate the effectiveness of
collective induction processes (Curs¸eu et al., 2015b). Following
the group synergy procedures (where the same task is performed
first by individuals and then by groups), we intend to evaluate
collective social sensitivity by asking groups, as collectives, to
perform the same (social sensitivity) task performed by their
individual members. We expect that group’s social sensitivity,
as a collective trait is positively related to collective intelligence.
A group that is capable, as a whole, to correctly identify other
people’s mental states and “tune in” accordingly, can use this
ability as a self-regulation mechanism to enforce coordination
processes, adjust to varying task demands and create a positive
group atmosphere. Group social sensitivity, hence, is expected
to be conducive for high levels of performance across multiple
tasks, and ultimately to positively predict CI. A similar concept,
collective emotional intelligence has been found to be positively
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associated with group effectiveness (Jordan and Troth, 2004;
Curs¸eu et al., 2015a). Collective emotional intelligence is a group-
level competence that reflects the ability of the group to develop a
set of norms that encourage expression, awareness and regulation
of affective dynamics within the group (Druskat andWolff, 2001;
Curs¸eu et al., 2015a).
To summarize, in line with previous research we expect that
all three indicators: minimum, maximum and collective social
sensitivity have a positive association with collective intelligence.
We argue, however, that the association between these three
indicators and collective intelligence is likely to be explained by
different mechanisms. The main aim of this paper is to estimate
the predictive power of these three variables simultaneously in
order to comprehensively understand the association between
social sensitivity and collective intelligence.
METHODS
Sample and Procedure
The sample consisted of 154 participants (78 women) organized
in 30 student groups. Group size varied from 3 to 6 members
(with a mean = 4.97, standard deviation = 0.60 and median
= 5). Groups worked together for a period of 3 months in
order to complete a research assignment for an organizational
studies course at a Dutch university. Groups were formed at the
beginning of the semester. Students were familiar with each other
but did not necessarily know each other. Groups were diverse
with respect to gender (Teachman index had a mean = 0.34,
standard deviation = 0.28 and median = 0.5). Group collective
intelligence was measured at the beginning of the 3-month
period while using the task battery and procedure described in
Engel et al. (2014) and Woolley et al. (2010). Participants were
seated in front of computers and had to complete the group
collective intelligence battery while communicating via text chat
only. The completion of the battery took 62 min in total. The
battery consists of a variety of tasks in line with well-developed
task taxonomies (McGrath, 1984; Larson, 2010), and includes
generating, choosing, remembering, executing, and sensing task
types. As an example, for execution tasks, which require careful
coordination of psychomotor skills of team members, team
members have to jointly type and reproduce long pieces of text
and numbers as accurately as possible; for sensing tasks, which
require groups to recognize patterns in a noisy stimulus that
is calibrated to exceed the capabilities of an individual, team
members have to study a large grid of images and words and
answer questions about them such as naming the most frequent
object in that grid (for a detailed description of the battery
see Engel et al., 2014). To calculate the collective intelligence
score, we performed a factor analysis of the groups’ scores on
all the tasks and derived the first factor that emerged from all
the groups’ scores. We used this score as the measure for group
collective intelligence, in line with Woolley et al. (2010) and
Engel et al. (2014).
Social sensitivity was measured with Reading the Mind in
the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The test consists of
36 images with eye-regions of the face of various individuals,
each representing a particular mental state (e.g., arrogant, desire,
insisting). Participants had to choose among four options the
mental state that was represented in the image. The correct
scores were summed up, with 36 being the possible maximum
score for the task. In a first step, participants were asked to
complete the task individually without talking to each other. In
each group the members with the highest and the lowest score
for the task were identified and were further used in the analyses
as representing the maximum social sensitivity score and the
minimum social sensitivity score. In a second step, participants
were asked to come together as a group, discuss the 36 images
and decide together which option was associated with the mental
state represented in each of the images. Each group generated one
set of solutions for the task and this score was further used in the
analyses as the group social sensitivity score.
Ethics Statement
According to the Dutch national ethical guidelines, studies aimed
at developing or evaluating professional tests and studies based
on questionnaires that do not require any personal data with the
potential to embarrass the participants are exempt from ethical
committee approval. Because one of the aims of our research was
to evaluate the CI battery in the Dutch context and our research
was carried out during regular curricular activities, we did not ask
for further approval from the local IRB.
RESULTS
All four indicators of social sensitivity (minimum, maximum,
mean group score and group social sensitivity score) are
positively and significantly correlated with the CI factor. First,
the maximum and the minimum score of social sensitivity are
positively and moderately associated with CI, with r(30) = 0.41,
p < 0.05 and respectively r(30) = 0.52, p < 0.01 (Table 1).
This indicates that the higher the maximum and the minimum
individual scores of social sensitivity in the group are, the higher
the level of collective intelligence is. To be noted, the minimum
score has the strongest correlation with CI among all four
predictors. In line with the results reported in Woolley et al.
(2010), the mean social sensitivity is also positively associated
with CI, r(30) = 0.48, p < 0.01, i.e., the higher the within-
group average of members’ social sensitivity scores is, the
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1. CI 0 1
2. Min social sensitivity 19.51 2.81 0.52***
3. Max social sensitivity 25.29 2.06 0.41** 0.46***
4. Mean social sensitivity 22.84 1.84 0.48*** 0.82*** 0.81***
4. Group social sensitivity 29.25 2.60 0.38** 0.51*** 0.73*** 0.75***
N = 30; Min Social Sensitivity = the lowest score in the group in the individual version
of social sensitivity task; Max Social Sensitivity = the highest score in the group in the
individual version of social sensitivity task; Mean Social Sensitivity = the average of group
members’ scores in the individual version of social sensitivity task; Group Social Sensitivity
= the unique score of the group in the group version of social sensitivity task.
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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higher collective intelligence of the group is. Finally, the group
social sensitivity score has the weakest positive and significant
association with CI, r(30) = 0.38, p < 0.05. This indicates that
the emergent, group-level social sensitivity has weaker positive
association with the CI. Moreover, all four social sensitivity
indicators positively correlate with each other. The strongest
associations are between mean social sensitivity and maximum
social sensitivity score, r(30) = 0.81, p < 0.01, and between mean
social sensitivity and minimum social sensitivity score, r(30) =
0.82, p < 0.01. This is expected, given that the mean social
sensitivity score includes both the maximum and the minimum
social sensitivity score in the group.
As shown in Table 1, the average group social sensitivity
is 29.25, while the average maximum social sensitivity score
equals 25.29, and the average mean social sensitivity (across all
groups) is 22.84. This pattern of results shows that the emergent,
group level social sensitivity is higher than the individual social
sensitivity.
In order to test our hypotheses we ran an OLS regression
analysis with minimum and maximum score of social sensitivity
in the group as well as group sensitivity score as predictors. In
order to avoid multicollinearity issues all variables have been
centered to their mean. We controlled for group size given that
group size varied in our sample. The results indicate that the
minimum social sensitivity score is the only significant and
positive predictor of CI, β = 0.49, p < 0.05 (Table 2, Model 2).
The maximum and group social sensitivity scores do not predict
collective intelligence with β = 0.19, p > 0.05 and β = −0.07,
p > 0.05 respectively. Group size is not significantly associated
with CI, with β = 0.25, p > 0.05. The overall model is significant
with F = 3.72, p < 0.01 and it explains 27% of the variability
of collective intelligence, with Adjusted R2 = 0.27. In order to
check the robustness of our findings we ran the analyses without
the control variables and the positive relationship between the
minimum social sensitivity score and CI remained significant,
β = 0.41, p < 0.05. The other social sensitivity predictors
remained non-significant just like in the previous model. The
overall model is significant with F= 4.07, p< 0.05 and it explains
24% of the variability of collective intelligence, with Adjusted
R2 = 0.24 (Table 2, Model 1). The lack of differences between
the two models indicates that our results are robust.
Given that there is a high correlation between the mean
sensitivity, maximum sensitivity score and minimum sensitivity
TABLE 2 | Results of regression analysis of social sensitivity on CI.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
β β
Group size 0.25
Min social sensitivity 0.41** 0.49**
Max social sensitivity 0.19 0.19
Group social sensitivity 0.04 −0.07
F-value 4.07** 3.72**
Adj R2 0.24 0.27
**p < 0.05.
score, we could not introduce all the variables in one regression
analysis due to multicolinearity concerns. In order to disentangle
the influence of the minimum score on top of the mean social
sensitivity score, we carried out an additional set of analyses. We
computed an additional variable: Mean social sensitivity1= (Sum
of sensitivity scores in the group − minimum social sensitivity
score in the group)/(Group size−1). This new variable represents
the mean group score on social sensitivity without the lowest
individual score in the group. First, we tested the influence
of Mean social sensitivity1 on collective intelligence, with and
without group size as a control (Model 1 and 2, Table 3). The
results indicate that Mean social sensitivity1 is not a significant
predictor of collective intelligence, with β = −0.07, p > 0.05
and respectively β = 0.01, p > 0.05 (while controlling for group
size). Second, we tested a model in which we included all the
sensitivity indicators (VIF<3), with and without group size as a
control (Model 3 and 4, Table 3). The only significant predictor
is the minimum social sensitivity score, with β = 0.48, p < 0.05
and β = 0.44, p < 0.05 (while controlling for group size). These
results provide additional support for the lowest social sensitivity
score being the strongest predictor of CI in the group.
DISCUSSION
Our results are consistent with research on the role of group
members’ personality on group dynamics and effectiveness that
showed that the predictive role of the lowest individual member
score is superior to the predictive role of themaximum individual
member score (Barrick et al., 1998; Van Vianen and De Dreu,
2001). Barrick et al. (1998) as well as Van Vianen and De Dreu
(2001) found that the lowest individual score for agreeableness,
extraversion and conscientiousness significantly predicted group
performance. In a similar vein, we show that the score of
least socially sensitive group member is predictive of collective
intelligence. In other words, highly collectively intelligent groups
are those in which the least socially sensitive group member
has a rather high score on social sensitivity or in groups where
members are not socially sensitive collective intelligence is less
likely to emerge. The collective intelligence battery consists of
tasks that mostly require a particular level of interdependence
TABLE 3 | Results of additional regression analysis of social sensitivity
on CI.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
β β β β
Group size 0.23 0.16
Mean social sensitivity1 −0.07 0.01 −0.20 −0.27
Min social sensitivity 0.48** 0.44**
Max social sensitivity 0.30 0.34
Group social sensitivity −0.08 −0.03
F-value 0.15 0.73 3.21** 3.88**
Adj R2 −0.03 −0.01 0.27 0.28
**p < 0.05, Mean social sensitivity1 = the average social sensitivity score in the group,
excluding the lowest individual social sensitivity.
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among the group members. When one of the group members
is not able to “tune in” with the rest of the group, this might
create coordination losses (Steiner, 1972) and eventually hamper
the progress of the task. This is also in line with the study by
Prewett et al. (2009) that shows that the minimum score in
personality traits is particularly relevant for tasks with intensive
workflow patterns, where work unfolds freely and frequently
among all teammembers. Such workflow patterns require intense
coordination, and while one highly sensitive member cannot
compensate for the rest of the group, one highly insensitive
member can disrupt the flow of coordination and diminish the
level of collective intelligence of the group.
In line with our predictions, group social sensitivity is
positively associated with CI, yet after introducing the minimum
social sensitivity score in the regression, this positive association
turned out to be not significant. Therefore, the strongest
predictor for CI is the lowest social sensitivity score in the group.
Since our study focuses only on the predictive power of the
compositional and compilational aspects of social sensitivity,
future studies could focus on further detailing the mechanisms
at play.
An interesting result that emerged is that groups, when
working together, scored significantly higher on the social
sensitivity task as compared to aggregates of individual social
sensitivity, as seen in maximum and mean individual scores. The
group synergy stream of research explores the extent to which
groups perform better than individuals in various types of tasks
(Larson, 2010); these results indicate that the combination of
individual (social) judgments during social interactions generates
group synergy. Previous empirical results show that collective
performance in cognitive judgmental (estimations with correct
answers that are difficult to demonstrate) and cognitive decision-
making (deciding among a limited number of options) tasks
rarely exceeds the performance of the best individual in the group
(Curs¸eu et al., 2013; Meslec and Curs¸eu, 2013). The task used in
the current study could also be considered a decision-making task
given that the group members had to choose one option among
four alternatives for each pair of eyes. Nevertheless, the content
of the task is rather different, as it refers to social judgments.
The results reported in this study suggest that the content of
the task may influence the extent to which groups manage to
achieve strong synergy or the extent to which they manage to
become better than the best member in their group. The finding
that social interactions within groups are conducive for strong
synergy in tasks requiring social judgments (the group social
sensitivity exceeds the maximum social sensitivity score within
the group), opens new venues for research in group synergy.
Future research could explore, using within-group designs,
whether the synergetic potential of groups is domain specific (the
group can achieve cognitive synergy in a single type of task) or
general (the group achieves synergy in several types of tasks).
Our study has several theoretical and practical implications.
First, we replicate the findings of Woolley et al. (2010) in a
different cultural setting and we replicate that social sensitivity
(as the mean score of individual member social sensitivity) is
correlated to the collective intelligence of the groups. Further, as
the mean social sensitivity is a composite score that includes both
the minimum and the maximum score in the group, we argue
that it can hide potential effects of these two scores on collective
intelligence, and show that the significant correlation of the
mean sensitivity score with collective intelligence is driven by the
minimum social sensitivity score in the group. Second, we refine
these findings further by trying to disentangle the compositional
and compilational factors that explain the positive association
between social sensitivity and collective intelligence. In general,
we find that group members cannot compensate for the lack
of social sensitivity of other group members. Harmonious
interpersonal interactions in groups, likely to be conducive for
collective intelligence, require that even the least socially sensitive
member scores relatively high on social sensitivity. In addition to
theoretical implications, this research has implications for group
design as well since it indicates that for a group to be able to
consistently perform well on a wide range of tasks it needs to be
composed of members that are highly socially sensitive.
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